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Like its predecessors,  this third NBER Macroeconomics  Annual presents two 
types  of papers.  Papers of the first type are relevant to current concerns 
about the  economy,  those  of the  second  type  seek both  to bring recent 
developments  in macroeconomics to a wider audience, and to demonstrate 
the empirical relevance of these new developments.  David Romer's paper 
on  the  economic  cost  of  excessive  deficits,  Kazuo Ueda's  paper  on  the 
causes  of  the  Japanese  current account  surplus,  and  the  three  shorter 
papers on the significance of the October 1987 stock market crash, are in the 
first category. Alberto Alesina's paper on recent developments  and tests in 
game theoretic approaches to economic policy making, Matthew Shapiro 
and Mark Watson's paper, which  seeks  to identify the sources of distur- 
bances to the economy,  and John Kennan's work on the very old and very 
basic  question  of  whether  the  labor market  acts  as  if  it  is  always  in 
equilibrium, fall into the second category. 
Traditionally, economic policy making has been studied  normatively: a 
social  planner  with  the  best  interests  of  society  at  heart optimizes  the 
relevant utility function. The outcome is a description of optimal policies. 
This  tradition is  essential  in  enabling  economists  to  say  which  policies 
should be adopted; its contributions are impressive, particularly  in the area 
of fiscal policy. More recently though, interest has shifted towards positive 
models  that attempt to explain actual, as opposed  to ideal, policy choices. 
The new models are game theoretic, with policy makers interacting with 
a public whose  interests  may  or may not be identical with  those  of the 
policymakers,  and recognizing  in more sophisticated models  the impera- 
tives of reelection and the possibility that the next government  will have 
different interests.  The proliferation of game  theoretic models  of policy- 
making in the last five years has not only bewildered  the reader who  is 
attempting  to keep  up with  the literature, but has also appeared to lack 
empirical power,  since there is at least one model  to justify any outcome 
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Alberto Alesina's  well-executed  intent is to bring order to the literature 
and to demonstrate its relevance to the economy.  He focuses on two sets of 
empirical implications of the literature: one for the political business  cycle, 
and one for central bank independence.  In each case he shows that the data 
have  some  power  to  discriminate  among  theories,  and  that  the  game 
theoretic approach does well in accounting for the facts. Alesina concludes 
by discussing a variety of other areas in which the game theoretic approach 
may help understand  macroeconomic events.  Both the discussants,  Ken- 
neth  Rogoff and  Kenneth  Shepsle,  approve  of  the  basic approach,  but 
suggest  extensions; there is no doubt that this field is still, despite its size, 
at an early stage. 
The U.S. budget deficit that developed  during the 1980's has been at the 
center of domestic  and international economic  policy controversy.  It has 
been held responsible for a major decline in domestic saving, for high real 
interest rates, and thus, indirectly, for the international debt problem, and 
for the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments.  However, 
an important subset  of the economics  profession believes  that the deficit 
does  not produce any such effects, because individuals recognizing that a 
deficit represents merely deferred taxation increase their own saving when 
the deficit rises-this  is the so-called Ricardian  equivalence  view  of deficits, 
which  is associated particularly with Robert Barro. 
Papers in the two previous issues  of this Annual bear on the role of the 
deficit. In 1986, Martin Feldstein showed  that the trade deficit is signifi- 
cantly affected by the budget deficit. In 1987, Douglas Bernheim reviewed 
the arguments  and evidence  for and against Ricardian equivalence,  con- 
cluding  against.  However  the evidence  in this area is surprisingly weak, 
and the controversy continues. 
David  Romer's  paper  is  an  innovative  attempt  to  move  beyond  the 
question of whether or not the budget deficit matters, and to ask instead to 
what  extent it might matter. This can only be done  in a model  in which 
Ricardian equivalence fails. Romer works with three different channels  of 
real effects of deficits: first, taxes that are cut today generate government 
debt that will be paid off later by other people, thus current deficits help the 
current generation  at the cost of future generations; second,  individuals 
may  not  be  able  to  borrow  freely  at  current  interest  rates  ("liquidity 
constraints"), so that an increase in the deficit and increase in disposable 
income increases consumption;  and third, because there are inefficiencies 
in the collection of taxes, cutting taxes now,  only to raise them above their 
initial level  in  the  future,  may  generate  welfare costs.  As  Romer notes, 
there are many other potential sources of real effects and costs of deficits, 
but these three are generally regarded as the most significant. He confines Editorial  3 
himself to a closed economy,  and thus does not address the international 
impact of large U.S. fiscal deficits. 
Romer's primary conclusion is that the intergenerational redistribution of 
welfare associated with temporary tax cuts that produce a deficit may be 
significant.  One  of his  more striking calculations is that under  plausible 
assumptions  a temporary tax cut that raises the deficit may have a cost that 
is as large as the tax cut. Also interesting is his result that the costs that arise 
from the inefficiency of allowing tax rates to vary over time are small. 
The discussants,  Paul Evans and James Tobin, both consider the welfare 
costs calculated by Romer to be too large. Evans argues that the evidence is 
simply inconsistent with the view that individuals do not internalize future 
taxes; he  argues that the models  used  by Romer should  have parameter 
values  showing  implications that are similar to those of Ricardian equiva- 
lence.  Tobin raises the  interesting  question  of why  the  theory  gives  so 
much attention to intergenerational distributional concerns when intragen- 
erational distributional issues  are not even considered. 
Shapiro and Watson address the question of the sources of business cycle 
fluctuations.  Until  the  1970's,  macroeconomists-both  Keynesian  and 
monetarist-argued  that demand shocks, caused by fiscal and/or monetary 
disturbances,  were  the prime causes of output fluctuations.  The oil price 
shocks  of  the  last  fifteen  years  shifted  analytic attention  to  the  role  of 
supply shocks. Equilibrium business  cycle theory has increasingly empha- 
sized supply  shocks, in part because it is difficult in equilibrium models  to 
find a good reason for demand disturbances to affect output. 
Using  a  technique  developed  by  Blanchard and  Quah,  Shapiro  and 
Watson are able to identify supply and demand shocks and describe their 
statistical characteristics. The  assumption  that enables  them  to  identify 
supply  from demand  disturbances is emphasized  in the  introduction  to 
their paper-that  only supply disturbances have permanent effects on the 
level  of  output.  This is a strong assumption  to which  one  can imagine 
exceptions: for instance, a change in individuals' desire to save, which is a 
demand  shock,  would  eventually  affect the equilibrium capital stock and 
thus output. But it is reasonable to assume that some of the most common 
demand  shocks,  such as an increase in demand  caused by an increase in 
the  money  stock,  indeed  have  only  temporary  effects  on  output.  The 
identifying assumption  they make is a good  starting point. 
Shapiro  and  Watson  assume  in  their first model  that  output  can be 
affected by shocks to technology,  the price of oil, aggregate demand,  and 
labor supply.  Over shorter periods, perhaps looking two years ahead, they 
find that shocks to aggregate demand  account for about 30 percent of the 
variability of output, and a much larger share of the variability of prices and 
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variability at the two year horizon. However,  Shapiro and Watson do find 
that nearly half of output variability, at all horizons, is caused by shocks to 
labor supply. 
At the conference,  Robert Hall proposed  eliminating what  he calls the 
Herbert Hoover  assumption-that  recessions  are caused by spontaneous 
attacks of laziness.  Results obtained in this case are presented  in Table 3, 
and show  a much larger impact of aggregate demand,  even at a five year 
horizon.  This leaves the paper with a major unresolved  issue-capsulized 
by the difficulty the reader has in knowing whether Table 2 or Table 3 gives 
a more accurate view of the sources of economic fluctuations. Shapiro and 
Watson indicate their preference for Table 2, arguing that they see no basis 
for attributing to aggregate demand the shocks that appear to be related to 
permanent labor supply fluctuations. They also argue that, for econometric 
reasons,  the  Table 3  estimates  are  only  a  loose  upper  bound  on  the 
contribution of aggregate demand  to output fluctuations. 
In Figures 3 and 6 Shapiro and Watson present time series estimates of 
the different shocks to the economy,  with the two charts corresponding to 
the assumptions  of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. While Figure 3 attributes a 
major part of the blame for the recent recessions  to labor supply  shocks, 
Figure 6 attributes most  recessions  to demand  shocks.  Thus,  the  paper 
leaves for future resolution the tough question of the underlying source of 
shocks, but does attempt to answer the key puzzle of output variation by 
attributing much of it to permanent changes in labor input. 
Interpreting joint fluctuations in employment  and wages  has been high 
on the agenda  of macroeconomics,  at least since Keynes'  General  Theory. 
Keynes' assumption  was that the level of labor input is determined by the 
demand  for  labor,  with  labor being  supplied  elastically  at  a  constant 
nominal  wage.  Given  that the quantity of labor demanded  is negatively 
related to the real wage, the General  Theory  assumption implied that the real 
wage  should  behave  counter-cyclically; high  in  recessions  and  low  in 
booms.  It  has  long  been  known  that  the  real  wage  does  not  show 
pronounced  counter  cyclical behavior,  a  fact that John  Kennan  amply 
documents  with data for six countries. 
The question then is what does account for the joint behavior of wages 
and employment?  A second Keynesian tradition, associated recently with 
John Taylor, attributes no  significance  to  movements  in  the  real wage. 
Rather, it  sees  the  price level  being  determined  as  a possible  constant 
markup  on  wages,  implying  a constant  real wage  over  the  cycle,  with 
employment  then being determined by the aggregate demand  for goods. 
Kennan examines the alternative approach, in which the labor market is 
interpreted  as  always  being  in  equilibrium. He  tests  such  models  with 
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showing  that some  U.S.  stylized facts do not hold in other countries. For 
instance, employment  is more variable than real wages  in Canada and the 
U.S.,  but not in the other countries in his sample. 
Kennan then  constructs and estimates  a labor market model  in which 
both workers and firms choose  employment  according to dynamic labor 
supply  and demand  models.  Costs of adjusting the labor input by firms, 
effects of past work  on current utility, and intertemporal substitution  of 
leisure (which works more when  wages are higher than they are expected 
to be in future) are responsible for the dynamic elements  in demand  and 
supply  respectively.  He also estimates a model  in which  labor supply  is 
controlled  by  a  monopoly  union.  The  model  does  reasonably  well  in 
accounting  for the joint behavior of employment  and  real wages  in the 
U.K., but not in the U.S. 
Kennan views  his results as sufficiently promising to continue explora- 
tion of equilibrium approaches. One of his discussants, Mark Bils, concurs, 
though he tends to favor alternative equilibrium models.  John Taylor, the 
second discussant,  argues that contracting models of the labor market do a 
superior job in accounting for the data. Here, too, is a discussion  that has 
been  sharpened,  but where much is left for future work to develop. 
The  Japanese  current  account  surplus  for  some  time  threatened  to 
disrupt U.S.-Japan trading relations. The most popular explanation for the 
surplus was  that Japan was  engaging  in unfair trade practices. However, 
that is not the main focus of Kazuo Ueda's paper on the topic. He does give 
some  weight  to  another  popular  explanation; restrictive Japanese  fiscal 
policy in the first half of the eighties accounts for the surplus. 
Ueda is mainly concerned with two other factors. The first is the decline 
in the real price of oil since 1981; the second is the U.S.  fiscal expansion. 
Looking back, Ueda also notes that the decline in the rate of investment in 
Japan in  the  1970's,  accompanied  by  a  lower  decline  in  saving,  helps 
account  for  the  underlying  trend  to  surplus  in  the  Japanese  current 
account. 
As  the Japanese current account has finally begun  to decline in dollar 
terms in 1987-88, the focus on the problem has declined.  Ueda  sees  the 
recent decline in the surplus as resulting from rising investment  in Japan, 
and  raises the  possibility  that in the future as in the  1970's, the  current 
account will be driven more by the behavior of domestic investment  than 
by fiscal policy. 
The final section of the Annual contains three papers on the implications 
for understanding  of markets of the stock market crash of October 1987. 
Participants were explicitly requested not to discuss the implications of the 
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to evaluate the efficient markets hypothesis  in the light of the behavior of 
the market in October. 
The  efficient markets hypothesis  asserts that market prices efficiently 
reflect all relevant information about firms' prospects. The efficient markets 
hypothesis  certainly does  not rule out abrupt, large price changes: prices 
should  change  rapidly  in  response  to  new  information.  However,  the 
question is whether any new information arrived in the middle of October 
that should have caused investors to conclude that stock prices needed  to 
be reduced by 20 percent. 
Fischer Black  attributes the crash to a sudden realization by investors that 
tastes in the market had been changing over the past several months.  In 
essence,  each (or at least many) realized that other investors were expecting 
the market to fall. In addition, Black is willing to entertain the notion that 
psychological factors affect participation in the market and also its level. He 
describes his as an equilibrium model,  though  not one in which  expecta- 
tions  are rational. Presumably,  the market does  not process  information 
optimally, and so is not efficient in that sense. 
It is quite another matter, as Kenneth French argues, to know when  the 
market is at an inappropriate level, and what to do when  it is. He believes 
on the basis of the very low dividend yields before the crash that the market 
was in fact overvalued-but  that this was not then known.  He, like Black, 
gives some weight to the dynamics of prices, suggesting that "the big news 
that drove price down  on October 19 may have been  the market's large 
response  to moderately bad news  over the previous three trading days." 
He does  not support the Brady Commission's  view  that limits should  be 
placed on price changes,  believing limits that prevent trading could make 
the situation worse. 
The third participant, Robert Shiller, had the insight and energy to poll 
market participants on  the day of the market crash and in the next few 
days. His direct evidence suggests there was very little news disturbing the 
market in the days just before the crash. People had concerns,  for example 
about the  deficit, but had not received and fresh news  in the middle  of 
October that caused price changes. Much of their reaction appears to have 
been to price changes  themselves. 
All the papers given  some  weight  to the possibility that price changes 
themselves  are regarded  as  important information,  and  thus  create the 
possibility that the market reflects "bubbles" rather than facts. French does 
not dismiss  this possibility; it appears that many analysts are now  more 
willing than they were before October 1987 to give some role to extraneous 
forces in moving market prices. But, as many participants argued, knowing 
that the  market may be  inefficient does  not  mean  that regulators could 
necessarily make it behave more efficiently. Editorial  7 
The  session  on  the  stock  market evoked  lively  discussion,  which  is 
reported after the papers. 
Funding for the conference was provided in part by the Sloan Founda- 
tion. Ricardo Caballero and Anil Kashyap of MIT helped edit this volume. 
Thanks are due to them, and to Kirston Foss of the NBER and her team for 
their efficient and friendly organization of the conference. 
Stanley  Fischer 